When applying subsection (1)(d), the court must consider an increase in the value of separate property without reference to the fact that the increase has just previously been classified as marital property under subsection (4). The trial court did not err in finding that there was an increase in the value of the husband's separate property during the marriage despite the fact that there was an aggregate decrease in the value of such property. In re Burford, 26 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2001).

Value of retirement account considered. The public employees' retirement association's interest of the husband or his estate is not subject to divestment by death or discharge. At some time, he or his estate must receive, at the very minimum, the amount of accumulated deductions in his individual account. His rights have a presently determinable cash surrender value equal to his salary deductions which otherwise would have been available for the use of the parties during the marriage. Even though the husband's interest in the fund is, by its very nature, incapable of division in kind, the value of that interest was properly taken into account in a marital property division. In re Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639 (1975).

Because a 401(k) account is a defined contribution plan, the court must determine the marital interest; but unlike a defined benefit plan, it need not consider future appreciation. In re Casias, 962 P.2d 999 (Colo. App. 1998).

When one spouse causes title to be placed jointly with the other spouse, a gift is presumed, and the burden to show otherwise is upon the donor. In re Moncrief v. Moncrief, 36 Colo. App. 140, 535 P.2d 1137 (1975).

Transfer during the marriage by one spouse to both spouses is understood to evidence a transfer to the marital estate in the absence of appropriate evidence that the property was excluded from being marital property by a valid agreement of the parties. The exception from the definition of marital property for any property acquired by gift does not apply to such transfer. In re Stumpf, 932 P.2d 845 (Colo. App. 1996).

Where separation agreement has been set aside, property transferred in accordance with the agreement was not excluded from the division of the marital property. In re Bisque, 31 P.3d 175 (Colo. App. 2001).

Presumption of gift not overcome. Parties' explanation that title to their home was placed in joint tenancy so as to avoid inheritance taxes does not overcome the presumption that a gift occurred; it merely expresses a reason why the gift was made. In re Moncrief v. Moncrief, 36 Colo. App. 140, 535 P.2d 1137 (1975).

Resembles division of property by co-owners rather than conveyance. Transfer of property by husband to his former wife in fulfillment of a property settlement agreement entered into by the parties and approved by the court granting the divorce is a recognition of a "species of common ownership" of the marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between co-owners and is not a transfer which resembles a conveyance by the husband for the release of an independent obligation owed by him to the wife. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 184 Colo. 1, 517 P.2d 1331 (1974).

Property acquired before legal separation deemed marital. Property acquired subsequent to a marriage but after the parties have separated without a decree of legal separation is not excepted from "marital property" by subsection (2). In re Carruthers, 40 Colo. App. 278, 577 P.2d 773 (1977); In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992).

Where parties lived apart for over eleven years without a decree of legal separation or a valid agreement for exclusion of property, property acquired during that period was marital property. In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992).

The presumption that property acquired by either spouse after marriage is marital property may be overcome by establishing that the property in question was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2). Assets not falling with the specific definition of separate property are deemed to be marital in nature subject to equitable division by the court. In re McCadam, 910 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1995); In re Seewald, 22 P.3d 580 (Colo. App. 2001).

Where a spouse takes title to property under circumstances that give rise to a resulting trust, that property has not been "acquired" for purposes of subsection (3), and, therefore, the trust property is not part of the marital estate. In re Martinez, 77 P.3d 827 (Colo. App. 2003).

Appreciation of separate property during the course of the marriage is considered marital property and such increase is subject to division under conditions set forth in this section. In re Fleet, 701 P.2d 1245 (Colo. App. 1985).

Appreciation accrued during period of reconciliation to be shared. The husband is entitled to an equitable share in the total amount of appreciation that accrued during a period of reconciliation after the wife became sole owner of the family home. In re Reeser, 635 P.2d 930 (Colo. App. 1981).

Where trial court failed to determine if there had been commingling of husband's premarital assets or if any marital appreciation in any of the trust assets had occurred and should have been included in the estate, property division could not be evaluated to determine whether it was inequitable. In re Seewald, 22 P.3d 580 (Colo. App. 2001).

Value of marital property sold by a spouse prior to filing of divorce action where spouse kept proceeds for himself is properly considered in dividing marital estate. In re Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389 (Colo. App. 1984).

Partnership property divided according to spouse's contribution. A trial court's division of partnership property can be based upon the contribution made by each party to the purchase of the property. In re Howard, 42 Colo. App. 457, 600 P.2d 93 (1979).

In order for partnership property to be considered as other than marital property under subsection (2)(d), the parties must have expressly agreed that the partnership assets would not become marital property. Otherwise, the question is one of intent of the parties, to be found as a fact by the trial court. In re Howard, 42 Colo. App. 457, 600 P.2d 93 (1979).

Because husband's partnership interest was vested and mature and not subject to future contingencies, trial court erred when it valued that interest by projecting the value of the partnership to the date of husband's expected retirement rather than the date of the parties' legal separation. In re Nevarez, 170 P.3d 808 (Colo. App. 2007).

Court can award any rights party may have resulting from existence of corporate assets. Although the court cannot award corporate assets to individual parties in a dissolution proceeding, the court can award to a party any rights he may have because of the existence of corporate assets. In re Davis, 44 Colo. App. 355, 618 P.2d 692 (1980).

Where husband's rights to commissions arose prior to the date of hearing, they constituted "marital property" and were subject to division. In re Johnson, 40 Colo. App. 250, 576 P.2d 188 (1977).

Money husband received in lieu of retirement benefits upon mandatory separation from Army constituted marital property subject to distribution under the terms of this section. In re Moore, 35 Colo. App. 280, 531 P.2d 995 (1975).

Residence acquired in anticipation of marriage is marital property. Where a family residence is selected and acquired within a few days of the parties' marriage in contemplation of that marriage, and the equity accumulated therein results from contributions by both parties, the court does not err in treating the residence and all equity obtained therein as marital property. In re Altman, 35 Colo. App. 183, 530 P.2d 1012 (1974).

Home purchased with wife's proceeds from sale of home owned prior to marriage is not. In view of evidence that the family home was purchased by the wife with the proceeds of the sale of a home which she owned prior to the marriage, the home was not "marital property" within the meaning of this statute. In re Armbeck, 33 Colo. App. 260, 518 P.2d 300 (1974).

Value of good will of spouse's business deemed marital property. In a division of marital property, the value of good will incident to husband's dental practice, which is an asset acquired during his marriage, must be considered as marital property. In re Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979).

Funds withdrawn by husband from joint bank account prior to wife's filing of petition for dissolution are "marital property" and should have been taken into account by trial court in making its property distribution, notwithstanding that the wife could not trace the funds after the withdrawal. In re Posinoff, 683 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1984).

Personal injury settlement offer, even if just for pain and suffering, is marital property if it arises from an accident which occurred during marriage. In re Fjeldheim, 676 P.2d 1234 (Colo. App. 1983).

Trial court erred in classifying a claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits as a marital asset where a claim had not been submitted to the insurance company as of the date of the hearing. In re Balanson, 996 P.2d 213 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 25 P.3d 28 (Colo. 2001).

Accounts receivable constituted marital property. In re Bayer, 687 P.2d 537 (Colo. App. 1984).

Appreciation of premarital property which is realized during marriage is subject to division upon dissolution of marriage. In re Van Genderen, 720 P.2d 593 (Colo. App. 1985).

Reorganization under chapter 11 of bankruptcy code does not necessarily establish a business held premaritally by husband as worthless, so that entire sum received from sale of business's subsidiary stock and liquidation of business constituted marital property for purposes of division of property pursuant to dissolution. In re Van Genderen, 720 P.2d 593 (Colo. App. 1985).

Shares in mutual fund were "marital property" subject to equitable division, notwithstanding that funds used to purchase shares may have originally been husband's separate property, where evidence established that husband's intent in purchasing shares was to make a joint investment with wife and that he intended that shares should pass to wife upon his death. In re Meisner, 715 P.2d 1273 (Colo. App. 1985).

Full increase in value of parties' separate property was properly treated as marital property. In re Young, 682 P.2d 1233 (Colo. App. 1984).

Property acquired during first marriage not marital property. Absent evidence of a contrary intent, property acquired during a first marriage between the parties and before their remarriage may not be declared marital property. In re Stedman, 632 P.2d 1048 (Colo. App. 1981).

Spouse's interest in a vested but unmatured employer-supported pension plan is marital property to the extent such plan has been funded by either employee or employer contributions during the marriage and is, therefore, subject to equitable distribution in dissolution proceeding. In re Grubb, 745 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1987); In re Blake, 807 P.2d 1211 (Colo. App. 1990).

Marital property subject to division does not include property acquired after the dissolution; however, compensation that is deferred until after the dissolution, but fully earned during the marriage, is marital property. In re Vogt, 773 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1989); In re Anderson, 811 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1990); In re Miller, 888 P.2d 317 (Colo. App. 1994).

Before a trial court can make an equitable distribution of pension rights, it must first determine the present value of such rights. In re Gavito, 794 P.2d 1377 (Colo. App. 1990).

Husband's vested, employer-supported pension plan held to be "marital property". In re Nelson, 746 P.2d 1346 (Colo. 1987); In re Blake, 807 P.2d 1211 (Colo. App. 1990).

Husband's nonvested military pension held to be marital property. In re Beckman, 800 P.2d 1376 (Colo. App. 1990).

Trial court did not err in ruling that it had no authority to distribute the military retirement pay that husband received during the year that the parties were separated where there was no evidence presented concerning the amount received during that period nor any evidence that either party had dissipated any funds that had been received. In re Riley-Cunningham, 7 P.3d 992 (Colo. App. 1998).

Under the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, the portion of a military retirement pension that constitutes veterans' disability retirement benefits may not be divided as marital property. In re Lodeski, 107 P.3d 1097 (Colo. App. 2004); In re Warkocz, 141 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2006).

Colorado state courts are not prohibited from dividing a military pension consisting of nondisability and disability retirement benefits as long as the portion of nondisability benefits is large enough to satisfy the other party's fractional share of the division. In re Lodeski, 107 P.3d 1097 (Colo. App. 2004).

Trial court was not preempted by federal law from characterizing special separation benefits (SSB) received by former husband upon his voluntary discharge from the Air Force as marital property and from awarding a portion of them to wife. The SSB had more of the characteristics of a deferred compensation plan than a severance payment, and, therefore, constituted marital property subject to distribution. In re McElroy, 905 P.2d 1016 (Colo. App. 1995); In re Heupel, 936 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1997).

SSB benefit paid out after entry of the decree held not to be a "post-decree benefit". Hence, trial court's action in awarding a portion of the benefit to wife as marital property did not constitute a reopening of the decree, but rather an appropriate action to enforce the decree which incorporated the parties' separation agreement. In re Heupel, 936 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1997).

Spouse's election under federal law to receive indivisible veterans' disability benefits and waive divisible military retirement after entry of permanent orders does not divest trial court of jurisdiction in subsequent contempt action to enforce permanent orders. In re Lodeski, 107 P.3d 1097 (Colo. App. 2004); In re Warkocz, 141 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2006).

For public policy reasons, military spouse should not be allowed to unilaterally defeat the other spouse's interest in military retirement pay by voluntarily waiving retirement pay in order to receive disability pay. In re Warkocz, 141 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2006).

A specific dollar amount need not be set forth in the dissolution decree in order to give the nonmilitary spouse a vested interest in military spouse's retirement benefit. In re Warkocz, 141 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2006).

Husband's interest in contingency attorney fees which were earned during the marriage constitutes marital property subject to division. However, any portion of the fees earned after dissolution should be subject to the "reserve jurisdiction method" whereby the trial court retains jurisdiction to distribute payments when the contingent funds are received. In re Vogt, 773 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1989).

An unliquidated personal injury claim is marital property within the meaning of this section. The trial court should consider the actual effect that personal injury had on the marital estate in determining what the equitable share of the claim should be, and the court is required to make specific findings supporting the division of such claim. In re Fields, 779 P.2d 1371 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 781 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1989).

Assets which consist of amounts received in settlement of husband's personal injury claim and wife's loss of consortium claim are marital property and should be distributed by the court after consideration of the needs and circumstances of the parties. In re Simon, 856 P.2d 47 (Colo. App. 1993).

Stock options owned by husband at the time of marriage but exercised during the marriage using marital funds are presumed to be marital property in the absence of a showing that husband used separate property, such as money he received from an inheritance, to exercise the options. In re Renier, 854 P.2d 1382 (Colo. App. 1993).

Husband's right to severance pay as a substitute for a loss of future wages does not constitute marital property. In re Holmes, 841 P.2d 388 (Colo. App. 1992).

To the extent an employee stock option is granted in consideration of past services, the option may constitute marital property when granted. On the other hand, an employee stock option granted in consideration of future services does not constitute marital property until the employee has performed those future services. In re Miller, 915 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1996).

Restricted stock options constitute marital property in their entirety where they represent a form of deferred compensation because husband had already earned the right to receive those shares. That husband's full enjoyment of the benefit is conditioned on his remaining an employee affects the present value of the restricted stock shares, not their marital nature. In re Miller, 915 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1996).

A trial court has discretion to apply the "time rule" formula to the division of stock options acquired during the marriage or to reserve jurisdiction to distribute the stock options if and when they are exercised. In re Balanson, 996 P.2d 213 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 25 P.3d 28 (Colo. 2001).

Employee stock options constitute property only when the employee has a presently enforceable right to the options, regardless of whether the options are presently exercisable. In re Balanson, 25 P.3d 28 (Colo. 2001).

Public employees' retirement association (PERA) disability benefit prior to age 65 replaces future earnings and does not constitute marital property. In re Hansen, 62 P.3d 1066 (Colo. App. 2002).

When disabled employee reaches the age of 65, the portion of PERA benefits attributable to years of service before disability constitutes marital property, and the balance remains separate property. Regardless of employee's recovery or work status, the benefits, excluding the unearned service credit projected until age 65, are more akin to retirement benefits. In re Hansen, 62 P.3d 1066 (Colo. App. 2002).

Future disability income of husband based upon disability insurance purchased during marriage with marital funds is marital property. In re Simon, 856 P.2d 47 (Colo. App. 1993).

Trial court erred in setting apart to wife as her separate property the portions of investment traceable to income generated from trust. In re Foottit, 903 P.2d 1209 (Colo. App. 1995).

Mechanism employed by the court for dividing the marital estate is a matter within the trial court's discretion. In re Dickey, 658 P.2d 276 (Colo. App. 1982).

Property order not terminable upon remarriage. Court order constituting an adjustment of property rights between a former husband and wife did not terminate upon remarriage of wife. Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973).

Share of marital estate contingent on remaining alive. Court cannot make a portion of husband's share of the marital estate contingent on his remaining alive. In re Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389 (Colo. App. 1984).

Home to spouse with child custody. Subsection (1)(c) makes it clear that it is desirable to award the family home to the spouse having custody of the children. In re Anderson, 37 Colo. App. 55, 541 P.2d 1274 (1975).

Subsection (3) provides that possession of title is not dispositive of the method of distribution of marital property. In re Thompson, 39 Colo. App. 400, 568 P.2d 98 (1977).

Intent evidenced that property no longer in joint tenancy. An order for the sale of marital property and distribution of the proceeds evidences an intent that the property is no longer to be held in joint tenancy. Gaskie v. Hugins, 640 P.2d 248 (Colo. App. 1981).

Order charging husband with selling property within one year effectively divided the marital property as of the date of the decree. In re Weaver, 39 Colo. App. 523, 571 P.2d 307 (1977).

Court ordered conveyance of separate property to wife or sale of both non-marital and marital property is violative of statute unless there is no other way to value and divide the property equitably. In re Sarvis, 695 P.2d 772 (Colo. App. 1984).

Where the husband's expenditures and labor enabled the wife to invest a considerable percentage of her income, they should be considered as contributions to the increase in their joint, and her several, property. Thompson v. Thompson, 30 Colo. App. 57, 489 P.2d 1062 (1971).

Promissory note between the husband and wife and the principal due thereunder, being property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage, were correctly treated as wife's separate property. Accrued interest should be treated as marital property and the interest payable as a marital debt, while interest accruing after the date of the decree is the wife's separate property. In re McCadam, 910 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1995).

Unless promissory notes demonstrate an intent that interest be treated as separate property, the interest accruing during the marriage is a marital asset, and any interest due at the time of the dissolution of the marriage is a marital debt. In re Lewis, 66 P.3d 204 (Colo. App. 2003).

Trial court lacked jurisdiction over the securities owned by the parties' children. However, trial court may consider the securities as a factor in determining how to allocate between the parties any marital debt related to the children's education. In re Gorman, 36 P.3d 211 (Colo. App. 2001).

A trial court, in ordering a division of property, cannot award to the divorced wife a share in property which might be acquired by the ex-husband after the order for a division of property has been made. Menor v. Menor, 154 Colo. 475, 391 P.2d 473 (1964).

Courts cannot divide property acquired after hearing or decree. Although courts must divide property on the basis of conditions existing at the date of the hearing or decree, they cannot consider the division of property which the parties may acquire afterwards. In re Johnson, 40 Colo. App. 250, 576 P.2d 188 (1977).

A trial court cannot award to one spouse in a dissolution a share in property which might be acquired by the other spouse after the order for division of property has been made. In re Ward, 657 P.2d 979 (Colo. App. 1982).

Court can allow wife to use husband's separate property if husband waived or intentionally relinquished the right to sole ownership of that separate property. Court, however, could not convey any ownership attributes of that property to wife. In re Ikeler, 148 P.3d 347 (Colo. App. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 161 P.3d 663 (Colo. 2007).

Law reviews. For article, "Valuation of Businesses in Colorado Divorces", see 32 Colo. Law. 73 (June 2003).

Market value of real property in dispute is standard adopted by the general assembly. In re Lord, 626 P.2d 698 (Colo. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982).

Necessity of finding current value of all property. Generally, in making a division of property, the court must find the approximate current value of all property owned by the parties, as well as the value of separate property at the time of the marriage or at the time of acquisition, if after marriage. However, where the court determines the percentage ownership each party has in the marital property, and that percentage is not an issue on appeal, the failure to make such findings of current value is not necessarily erroneous. In re Weaver, 39 Colo. App. 523, 571 P.2d 307 (1977).

This section expressly requires that property be valued as of the date of the dissolution of the marriage or as of the date of the hearing on disposition of the property if such hearing precedes the date of dissolution. This provision is mandatory, and the only exception is that the marital property dissipated before dissolution of the marriage can be valued as of the date the property last existed. In re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995); In re Finer, 920 P.2d 325 (Colo. App. 1996); In re Lockwood, 971 P.2d 264 (Colo. App. 1998).

The trial court did not have discretion to create, for equitable purposes, a fictitious date of dissolution for purposes of calculating the wife's share of the husband's military pension. In re Lockwood, 971 P.2d 264 (Colo. App. 1998).

Court's discretion in determining property valuation date. This section gives the trial court broad discretion in matters of property division, including determination of the property valuation date for division of marital property. Gaskie v. Hugins, 640 P.2d 248 (Colo. App. 1981).

Court's valuation was sufficiently supported by evidence of parties' agreement as to value of lot, wife's response to husband's request for admission of current market value of property, and verified financial statements and proposed final orders submitted by both parties. In re Price, 727 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1986).

Valuation on the date of dissolution based on an earlier agreement does not abuse court's discretion, where trial court was fully appraised of its duty to value the disputed lot as of the date of dissolution. In re Price, 727 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1986).

Subsequent testimony to the valuation as of the date of dissolution which concerned the value of the disputed lot was not sufficient as a matter of law to overcome documentary evidence to the contrary. In re Price, 727 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1986).

Stipulated values not binding. Where the trial court has determined that fairness and equity require that the division be an equal one, the stipulated values set 10 years before are neither binding nor relevant. Gaskie v. Hugins, 640 P.2d 248 (Colo. App. 1981).

However, parties' agreement as to the value nine months before the date of dissolution was not outdated and irrelevant to court's determination of real estate's value. In re Price, 727 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1986).

Trial court is not bound by partnership agreement in determining value of law practice. Where partnership agreement was designed to discourage partners from leaving firm and it appeared husband intended to stay with firm, court was free to use an alternate valuation method such as the excess earnings method. In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992).

Because husband's partnership interest was vested and mature and not subject to future contingencies, trial court erred when it valued that interest by projecting the value of the partnership to the date of husband's expected retirement rather than the date of the parties' legal separation. In re Nevarez, 170 P.3d 308 (Colo. App. 2007).

Excess earnings method is a generally accepted method for determining the present value of a person's interest in a business, representing both tangible assets and goodwill. In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992).

Excess earnings method did not result in "double dipping" by wife awarded maintenance as well as a portion of present value of husband's interest in law practice. In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992).

Weight to be accorded to the valuation techniques of an expert is for the trial court's determination, depending upon the court's assessment of the reliability of the data in a particular case. In re Bookout, 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993); In re Antuna, 8 P.3d 589 (Colo. App. 2000).

Decision as to which valuation method to rely on is a factual determination to be made by the trial court. In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992); In re Page, 70 P.3d 579 (Colo. App. 2003).

Marketability discount may be applied in determining value of husband's business where court determines that failure to do so would unfairly penalize husband for ownership of shares that cannot be readily sold or liquidated. The court must make a clear record of the reasons for applying a given discount rate. In re Thornhill, 200 P.3d 1083 (Colo. App. 2008).

It was within the trial court's discretion to accept wife's opinion of value as an owner of the marital residence, which opinion was partially based upon her extensive knowledge of the property, a heightened awareness of its value, and the valuations provided to her. In re Lewis, 66 P.3d 204 (Colo. App. 2003).

Goodwill is a property or asset which supplements the earning capacity of another asset, business, or a profession, and, therefore, is not the earning capacity itself. In re Bookout, 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993).

The value of goodwill in an ongoing physical therapy practice is properly measured by arriving at a present value based upon past results and not by accounting for the postmarital efforts of the professional spouse. In re Bookout, 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993).

Identification, valuation, and division of husband's "good will" as a portion of his physical therapy practice did not divide husband's future income. In re Bookout, 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993).

Trial court erred in failing to credit wife with the value of her interest in a medical practice as a marital asset. In re Antuna, 8 P.3d 589 (Colo. App. 2000).

The conservation of the principal of an estate is, in itself, a valuable contribution which should be considered. In re Wildin, 39 Colo. App. 189, 563 P.2d 384 (1977).

When determining the present value of a vested interest in a trust that is subject to divestment based on a condition subsequent, a variety of circumstances should be considered, including actuarial information concerning the life expectancy of the life estate beneficiary and information concerning the future distributions to that beneficiary. In re Dale, 87 P.3d 219 (Colo. App. 2003).

In disposing of a vested but unmatured pension plan, the principles of fairness and equity must attend the valuation process, and the contingencies underlying the particular pension plan must be taken into account. In re McGinnis, 778 P.2d 282 (Colo. App. 1989).

Valuation of undisclosed assets. Once property has been divided pursuant to this section, such property becomes akin to separate property, and any increase in the valve of ownership interest therein should be considered when determining valuation. The failure to do so constitutes a confiscatory taking. In re Hiner, 710 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1985).

Increase in value of separate property after dissolution of marriage is necessarily separate. In re Campbell, 43 Colo. App. 72, 599 P.2d 275 (1979).

The amount by which the present value of an asset of a spouse acquired before the marriage exceeds its value at the time of the marriage constitutes a marital asset. In re Burford, 950 P.2d 682 (Colo. App. 1997).

In carrying out the division of the marital estate, the dissolution court should first add to the marital estate the amount of increase during the course of the marriage, if any, in each asset that was owned by each party before marriage. If an asset suffered a decrease in value, it should be disregarded in calculating the overall value of a spouse's separate property. Then the court should consider whether the overall value of the spouse's entire separate property has increased or decreased for the purpose of dividing the marital estate. In re Burford, 950 P.2d 682 (Colo. App. 1997).

Although the assets paid off by husband may not have increased in fair market value, husband's use of marital funds to pay off his separate debts substantially increased his equity in his separate property and must be considered in the property division. It is not necessary that the spouse produce a marital "asset" capable of being divided when marital funds are used to pay off one spouse's premarital debts. It is sufficient that the spouse paying off or paying down the separate property received a benefit from the marital income such as increased equity in its own property. The court should consider the benefit as an economic circumstance. In re Burford, 26 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2001).

When debts have already been paid, they may be allocated in the property division through reimbursement. In re Burford, 26 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2001).

Debts incurred during the marriage but which are dissolution litigation costs should be allocated pursuant to § 14-10-119. In re Burford, 26 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2001).

In the case of a pension plan inaccessible prior to the employee's distant retirement and terminable upon the employee's death, the risk of forfeiture is an important factor for the trial court to consider. In such a case it would be inequitable to require an immediate, lump-sum payment unless the present value included the risk of forfeiture as a factor. In re McGinnis, 778 P.2d 281 (Colo. App. 1989).

Vested but unmatured pension benefits are marital property not subject to inflexible rules of property valuation. Combination of deferred distribution and reserve jurisdiction valuation based on earliest possible retirement date for husband with full benefits proper where husband was not currently entitled to retirement benefits. In re Kelm, 878 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 912 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1996).

No basis for reversal despite court error in valuing wife's vested but unmatured PERA retirement fund. Because PERA combines elements of defined benefit and defined contribution plans, it was error for the court to base the present value of the wife's PERA account purely upon her contributions as of the date of dissolution. A proper determination of present value required the application of a series of actuarial and investment assumptions relating to the wife's life expectancy and probable retirement age to the contractual or statutorily awarded benefit. However, because husband acquiesced in this error and failed to present any evidence at trial as to the value of wife's PERA pension and because he made no objection or argument challenging wife's valuation during the permanent orders hearing, there is no basis for reversal. In re Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889 (Colo. App. 2003).

Unvested, unmatured, noncontributory defined benefit pension plans are affected by different contingencies from those where plans are vested. In re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995).

Three methods of distribution are at court's disposal in order to divide a pension plan upon dissolution: (1) Net present value; (2) deferred distribution; and (3) reserve jurisdiction. In re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995).

"Time rule" formula, used to apportion pension benefits under the net present value and deferred distribution methods, described in In re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995).

"Subtraction method" disapproved. Under the net present value method of distributing a pension plan, trial court's procedure of subtracting the present value of the husband's pension at the time of the marriage from the present value of the husband's pension at the time of the dissolution represented an abuse of discretion because, under the circumstances, this procedure grossly overstated the wife's share. In re James, 950 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1997).

Trial court had discretion to use subtraction method instead of the time-rule formula where the value of the trust was unrelated to any efforts taken by wife or husband, post-dissolution enhancements were irrelevant, and the wife failed to explain why the time-rule formula would produce a more accurate and fair apportionment of the trust interest. In re Dale, 87 P.3d 219 (Colo. App. 2003).

Trial court is not preempted from using the net present value method to distribute an unmatured military pension. In re Riley-Cunningham, 7 P.3d 992 (Colo. App. 1998).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in offsetting the net present values of the parties' military pensions and making a present distribution of the respective pensions, even though husband was retired from active duty while wife was not entitled to retire immediately and was still on active reserve. In re Riley-Cunningham, 7 P.3d 992 (Colo. App. 1998).

Court did not err by distributing husband's railroad retirement benefits using the net present value method. In re Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889 (Colo. App. 2003).

However, trial court is required to apply the coverture fraction, the accepted means of calculating the marital share of a pension, by multiplying the present value of the pension by the number of years or months that benefits accumulated during the marriage and dividing by the total number of years or months that benefits accumulated. In re Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889 (Colo. App. 2003).

Court should have considered actuarial information concerning the life expectancy of husband's parents and relevant information concerning the likelihood that trustee would invade the trust corpus in the future in determining the net present value of a vested interest in a trust that is subject to divestment on a condition subsequent. In re Mohrlang, 85 P.3d 561 (Colo. App. 2003).

Post-divorce pension enhancements are not necessarily separate property. Although post-divorce earnings are undisputably separate property, pension enhancements are subject to application of the "time rule" formula and may be apportioned. In re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995).

Economic fault may be considered by the trial court when it is dividing marital assets. In re Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169 (Colo. App. 2006).

"Economic fault" concept rejected as a factor in distribution of post-divorce pension enhancements. In re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995).

Court is not required to value or divide the parties' respective retirement plans by any set method so long as the division is equitable. No error in awarding wife the entire contribution she had made to a Public Employee Retirement Account where the benefits from such contribution were significantly less than husband's retirement benefits. In re Kelm, 878 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 912 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1996).

Court may retain jurisdiction over the distribution and valuation of stock options so that each party will "share in the risk of the fate of each of the options." In re Huston, 967 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1998).

Wife entitled to amount of husband's retirement funds, in the event of his death, only to extent of contributions made as of the date of dissolution. In re Kelm, 878 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 912 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1996).

An obligation to guarantee the debt of another should not be considered in a property valuation when the chance of liability is so small as to be speculative. If there is a quantifiable likelihood of liability, the obligation should be valued at its face amount times the percentage chance of liability. In re Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169 (Colo. App. 2006).

Just as a court is required to allocate the contingent value of assets in pensions and trusts, it must similarly determine the value of a contingent marital debt. It may do so in one of two ways: (1) Determine, on the basis of testimony, the potential obligation, discounted to reflect the percentage of liability; or (2) otherwise divide the marital assets and debts, reserving jurisdiction to allocate the contingent marital debt until such time as the amount of such contingent debt has been determined. In re Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169 (Colo. App. 2006).

"Seller's costs". The trial court did not err in not deducting normal seller's costs from the value of the home when it purported to split between the parties the remaining equity in the home because "seller's costs" were speculative at best. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 535 P.2d 1122 (1975).

Husband not entitled to share in the future appreciation of the home because property is valued at the dissolution hearing or property division hearing. In re Wornell, 697 P.2d 812 (Colo. App. 1985).

Loss apportioned. The trial court may apportion a loss in value of separate property between the parties. In re Talarico, 36 Colo. App. 389, 540 P.2d 1147 (1975).

Conclusion that parties did not contribute to enhancement of stock proper. Since investment patterns of persons in a situation similar to a particular married couple is not a matter of common knowledge, and therefore, comparisons of the investments in the wife's portfolio to those of some hypothetical average investor or a skilled investment counselor were merely speculation, it was proper for the trial court to conclude on the basis of such observations that neither party contributed to enhancement of the value of the stocks. In re Wildin, 39 Colo. App. 189, 563 P.2d 384 (1977).

Valuation of intangible assets of husband's business. In determining the intangible value of husband's business, the important consideration is whether husband's business has a value to him above and beyond the tangible assets. In re Martin, 707 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1985); In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992).

Spouse was not entitled to any increase in value of assets awarded to her from the date of the decree to the date the permanent orders were entered where the decree was entered prior to the date of the hearing on disposition of property. In re Graff, 902 P.2d 402 (Colo. App. 1994).

Specific determination of the nature and elements of goodwill may be required when court orders one party to execute a covenant not to compete for protection of the goodwill of a business awarded to the other party. In re Fischer, 834 P.2d 270 (Colo. App. 1992).

Central to the valuation of property is the determination whether the property will actually be sold, thereby resulting in a net equity. The court should consider husband's intentions as to whether he will sell the property at issue, and if the property is to be sold, the finding of net equity must comport with the evidence. In re Finer, 920 P.2d 325 (Colo. App. 1996).

In case of dissipation of property, trial court's alternative ruling that stock shares could be valued at the time when they were sold, if that value was higher than the value on the date of the decree, was proper. In re Huston, 967 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1998).

Trial court did not err in valuing a leased automobile at $13,500, where husband had recently prepaid $13,500 on the lease of the leased vehicle. In re Balanson, 996 P.2d 213 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 25 P.3d 28 (Colo. 2001).

Subsection (5) makes no provision regarding the date on which interest should begin to accrue on any sum ordered to be paid as part of the division of marital property. In re Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806 (Colo. App. 2007).

Applied in In re Thompson, 706 P.2d 428 (Colo. App. 1985).

Scope of review. Division of property in dissolution of marriage proceedings may only be overturned upon a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. In re Talarico, 36 Colo. App. 389, 540 P.2d 1147 (1975); In re Sharp, 823 P.2d 1387 (Colo. App. 1991).

An appellate court will alter a division of property only if the trial court abuses its discretion. In re Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1977).

One who has accepted benefits of judgment may not seek reversal of that judgment on appeal. In re Jones, 627 P.2d 248 (Colo. 1981).

Acceptance of the benefits of a judgment constitutes a waiver of appeal rights only if such action is inconsistent with the basis for the appeal. It is when the appeal, if successful, will again put into issue the right of the party to receive the benefits already accepted that a waiver of the right to appeal has been found. In re Antuna, 8 P.3d 589 (Colo. App. 2000).

Husband is not barred from appealing portion of the property division where he had previously received his share of the retirement funds pursuant to the parties' agreement before the hearing on permanent orders. In re Antuna, 8 P.3d 589 (Colo. App. 2000).

A trial court having reached its conclusions and entered its order and judgment on documentary evidence alone, the supreme court was as well qualified to determine the equities involved in a divorce action concerning a division of the property of the parties as was the trial court, and under such circumstances, presumptions in favor of the correctness of the order and judgment were not conclusive. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 134 Colo. 96, 299 P.2d 1095 (1956).

In an action for divorce, where the questions presented to the appellate court for review concern only the property rights of the parties, matters relating to the divorce were not considered. Wigton v. Wigton, 73 Colo. 337, 216 P. 1055 (1923).

Where the reporter's transcript of the testimony taken at a hearing on division of property in a divorce action was not included in the record on error, the supreme court assumed that the trial court had before it the entire situation of the parties, that the evidence before the court fully supported the determination made, and that all conflicting claims of the parties were properly resolved. Gier v. Gier, 139 Colo. 289, 339 P.2d 677 (1959).

Where a decree ordering the title to property to remain in joint tenancy and granting the rights of possession and income in the property to the wife was not challenged, and had long since become final, the supreme court could not review it. McDonald v. McDonald, 150 Colo. 492, 374 P.2d 690 (1962).

Under the law of the case doctrine, conclusions of an appellate court on issues presented to it, as well as rulings logically necessary to sustain such conclusions, become the law of the case and generally must be followed in subsequent proceedings in that case. However, application of the law of the case by a trial court to its property division rulings entered prior to an appeal is a discretionary rule of practice. The trial court's original permanent orders lose any binding effect or precedential value when they are reversed on appeal. In re Burford, 26 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2001).

Enforcement of property settlement. Ordering the payment of an amount due pursuant to the terms of the property settlement, together with interest, is an enforcement of the original decree and not a modification of the property settlement. In re Schutte, 721 P.2d 160 (Colo. App. 1986).